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In November 1973, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration
(NASA) asked the National Academy.of Engineerirg x to conduct a summer study
of future applications of space systems, with particular emphasis on prractical.
approaches, taking into consideration socioeconomic benefits. NASA asked thatk	
the study also consider how these applications would influence or be influenced
by the Space Shuttle System, the principal space transportation system of the
1980's. In December 1973, the Academy agreed to perform the study and assigned
the task to the Space Applications Board (SAB).
In the summers of 1967 and 1968, the National Academy of Sciences had
convened a.group of.eminent scientists and engineers to determine what research.
and development was necessary to per it the exploitation of useful applications
of earth-oriented satellites. The SAB concluded that since the NAS study,
operational weather and communicfcions satellites and the successful first
year of use of the experimc ta.i. Earth. Resources Technology Satellite had demon-
strated conclusively a technological capability that could form. a foundation
for expanding the useful applications of space-derived information and services,
and that it was now necessary to obtain, from a broad cross-section of potential
users, new ideas and needs that might guide the. development of future space
systems for practical applications.
After discussions with NASA and other interested federal agencies, it
was agreed that
.
a major aim of the "summer study" should be to involve, and
to attempt to understand the needs of, resource managers and other decision-
makers who had as yet only considered space systems as experimental rather
than as useful elements of major day-to-day operational information and service
systems. Under the general direction of the SAB, then, a representative group
of users and-potential users conducted an intensive two-week study to define
user needs that might be met by information or services derived from earth
orbiting satellites. This work was done in July '1974 at Snowmass, Colorado.
For the study, nine user"oriented panels were formed, comprised of present	 1
including bus nessmen.,'state and localor potential public an  private users; 
government officials, resource managers, and other decision-makers. A number
*Effective July 1, 1974, the National Academy.of Sciences and the National
Academy of Engineering reorganized the National Research Council into eight
assemblies and commissions, All National Academy.of Engineering program ur►its,
including the SAB, became the Assembly of Engineering.
r.
of scientists and technologists also participated, functioning essentially
j,	 as expert consultants. The assignment made to the panels included reviewing
progress in space applications since the NAS study of 1968* and defining user
needs potentially capable.of being met by space-system applications. User
specialists, drawn from federal, state, and local governments and from business
and industry, were impaneled in the following fields:
Panel l:. Weather and Climate
Panel 2: Uses of Communications
Panel 3: Land Use Planning
Panel 4: Agriculture, Forest, and Range
Panel 5: Inland. Water. Resources
Panel. 6 ,
 Extractable Resources
Panel 7: Environmental Quality
Panel 8: Marine and Maritime Uses
!	 Panel 9: Materials Processing in. Space
In addition, to study the socioeconomic benefits, the in£luence.of tech-
nology, and the interface with space transportation systems, the following 	 j
panels .(termed interactive panels) were convened:
i	 Panel 10: Institutional. Arrangements
Panel. 11: Costs and Benefits
Panel 12;: Space' Transportation
Panel 13: Information Services and Information Processing
Panel 14: Technology
As a basis for their deliberations, the latter groups used needs expressed
by the user pa LOOS. A :substantial amount of interaction with. the user panels
I	 was designed into the study plan and was found to be both desirable and neces-
sary.
The major part of the study was accomplished by the panels. The function
of the SAB was to review the work of the.panels, to evaluate their findings,.	 a
and to derive from their work an integrated set of major conclusions and recom^
mendations.. The Board's findings, which -include certain significant recommen-
dations from the panel reports, as wail as more general ones arrived at by
considering the woxk . of the study ds a whole, are contained in a report pre-
pared by the Board.**
It should be emphasized that the study was not designed to make detailed
assessments of all of the factors which should be considered in establishing
priorities. In some cases, for example, options other than space systems . £or .
accomplishin a, the same objectives may need to be assessed; requirements for 	 {
1
1
*National Research Council.. UsefuZ Applications of Earth--Oriented SatelZites.,
Report of the Central Review Committee National Academy of Sciences,
Washington, D.C., 1969. 	
1*space' Applications ,Board, National, 'Research Council. Pr^acticaZ A.ppZzcat ons	 lr	 of Space Systems. National Academy of Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1954
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institutional oT organizational support may need to be appraised; multiple
uses of systems may need to be evaluated to achieve the most efficient and
economic returns. In some cases, analyses of costs and benefits will be needed.
In this connection, specific cost-benefit studies were not conducted as a part
of the two-week study. Recommendations for certain such analyses, however,
a
	
	 appear in the Board's report, together with recommendations designed to provide
an improved basis upon which to make cost-benefit assessments.
In sum, the study was designed to provide an opportunity for knowledgeable
and experienced users, expert in their fields, to express their needs for
information or services which might .(or might not) be met by.space systems,
and to relate the present and potential capabilities of space systems to their
needs. The study did not attempt to examine in detail the scientific, techni-
cal, or economic bases for the needs expressed by the users.
` The SAB''was impressed by the quality of the panels' work and has asked
that their reports be made. available as supporting documents for the Board's
report. While the Board is in general accord with the panel reports, it does
not necessarily endorse them in every detail.
The conclusions and recommendations of this panel report should be con-
sidered within the context of the report prepared by the Space Applications
Board. The views presented in the panel report represent the general: consensus
of the panel. Some individual members of the panel may not agree with every
conclusion or recommendation contained in the report.
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INTRODUCTION
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 (P.L. 85-568) established,
as national policy, that aeronautical and space activities of the United States
"should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind." The
i National Aeronautics anc -race Administration (NASA) was charged with responsi-
bility to:
"(1) plan, direct, and conduct aeronautical and space activities;
11 (2) arrange for participation by the scientific community in plan-
ning scientific measurements and observations to be made through
use of aeronautical and space vehicles, and conduct or arrange
for the conduct of such measurements and observations; and
"(3) provide for the widest practicable and appropriate dissemination
of information concerning its activities and the results thereof."
The progress made in fulfilling these charges serves as a dramatic example
of what can be achieved in a carefully planned., well-managed, and technically
sound national effort relying on the capabilities of all sectors of the nation.
Less than a decade and a half after passage of the act_ initiating the U.S. space
program, an entirely new technological capability had been developed and demon--
strated. It provided an important extension to our ground, air:, and sea capabil
i..ties for a wide range of uses that benefit mankind. Indeed, operational satel-
lites have already significantly changed technological approaches in the fields
of weather and communications and have had beneficial influe-,ces throughout the
world. Space systems that survey earth resources..are serving'e.:xperimental uses,
clearly demonstxati;,g the capability of :providing large amounts of information
about a wide variety of dynamic characteristics of the earth.
The U.S. and the rest of the world, however, have only scratched the. sur-
face of potential useful. applications of space technology. The United States
has not yet committed itself to a program designed to assure the widest practi-
cable useful application of this new capability "...devoted to peaceful purposes
r	 for the benefit of all mankind."
4.
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	 The Panel on Institutional Arrangements believes that space systems capabil-
ities are now at the stage where an effort to apply those capabilities is
i
	
	 warranted. Achieving full return on U.S, space investments will require a
deliberate program to apply space systems (1) as a supplement to existing ground,
sea, and air systems, (2) as a more effective alternative to present methods,
and (3) as a means of providing previously nonexistent capabilities. The Panel
recognizes that such an effort will require continuing federal investment in
technological research,.development, and demonstration . activities. The Panel
believes that federai funding will be requited -- and should be provided 	 for
many user-oriented institutional and infrastructure developmental activities
that will constitute a major part of this new phase of the national space program.
In this.phase, the Panel believes it is necessary to encourage funding as well .
asin-kind support from state and local governments and from private.organiza-
tions that in many cases will be the implementers in applying space technology.
In defining institutional arrangements to assure the widest practicable
application of space systems, the Panel has considered a number of- factors.
Among them are the following:
Many federal, state, and local government agencies, private groups,
and international organizations.are involved in activities that can:
benefit from space systems.
There are very few fields in . which the potential user community
(users within federal, state, and local govexrment and agencies in.
the private sector) is sufficiently well aggregated to assure that
user interests and needs can be adequately represented by a single
..group. Generally, it.zs difficult
. 
for interested federal agencies or
even bureaus within one agency to agree that any one. of them . ' can speak
for the needs of all. Nonfederal users also are not generally prepared
to accept one member as representative of all.
The ability of users to understand. the significance of space systems
and space-derived data and to apply them in their operations varies
widely. Some individuals and organizations interested and technically,
competent consider as operatio=4 their use of information or services
provided by space systems that actually are experimental and develop-
mental. At the other extreme there are large numbers of potential
users who have never considered whether or not space systems can be
ofhelp in their activities, and in fact have no idea what is avail-
able. Perhaps the greatest problem is to provide,. to an organization
that has attained a,position of technical. leadership using long-standing-
and well-developed techniques, a basis upon which to objectively evalu-
ate the, possible benefits of switching to new techniques based; on
space systems.
Users generally are reluctant to discard their existing systems and
methods and even.,..ta dry using. new systems based on spacecraft unless
they are reasonably assured that there will be continuity in the data
ax. services provided by the satellites. The usefulness of the infor
mati.on.or services which spacecraft provide can be most accurately
! "	 fi
r
assured by encouraging the involvement of potential users. The result-
ing feedback should assist in judging the -potential benefits from use
.	 t
of the space system. This is the normal market evaluation process used
by industrial organizations.
From the experience already gained in using the products of the first
earth resources v^chnology satellite, and with the capabilities that
the space shuttle and its space laboratory will provide, it seems clear
that each spacecraft or each manned flight mission can serve many dif-
ferent users. For such multiple-use spacecraft or missions, however,
there do not exist adequate institutional arrangements for establish-
ing payload priorities, guaranteeing users an input to spacecraft and
mission definition, and coordinating user requirements. Integration of
the requirements of multiple users and evolution of realistic mission
plans for space systems will be sufficiently complex and costly to make
it essential to have an effective and disciplined mechanism for feedback
and negotiation on mission characteristics, costs, optimum arrangements
of sensors, scheduling, etc.
As should be expected, especially in view of tight.federal budget con-
straints and current economic problems, the Office of Management and
Budget (OMB) is skeptical of efforts 7W establish any operational space
system capability until hard assessment has been made of potential
benefits in relation to costs. The OMB tries to assure that options
for program and budget determination are not foreclosed by implied or
explicit operational commitments.
Data from the Department of Defense (DOD) space missions are not gener-
ally available for use by civilian federal, state, and local governmental
agencies and by commercial and other private users.
To date, charges to users of space-derived data have covered only direct
costs, for example, the costs of pictures or tapes. However, when pro-
grams proceed from the experimental to the operational stages, it may be
appropriate to increase user charges to cover costs of increasing
capability to provide day.. and to conduct special missions for particular
users. It must be noted, however, that pricing policy could have
significant impacts beyond the simple raising r^.. revenue. Pricing policy
could be used to shape the transition from Tusearch and development to
operational uses. For example, a price which just recovers out—of-
pocket reproduction costs during the research and development stage
could encourage transitional use while a higher price in the operational
stage.could help recover system costs.
.1
In addition to the above factors, the Panel also took into consideration
numerous established practices and existing agreements, as well as relevant
o
 T9anizational expexiences. NeveT theless, the Panel recognizes that its analy-
sis is not a complete one. Time did not permit the Panel to deal with certain
specific and detailed issues that arise from the work of various other Panels.
For example,. there are. clearly institutional barriers to direct broadcasting
from satellites , to individual homes in dispersed and sparsely po P ulated areas,
ias suggested by the Panel c
to-international banking si
also considered by the Comt
envisioned by the Panel on
study is needed of such is:
institutional requirements
systems to aai.seve fully tl
Jses of Communications for certain public services;
:ms based on use of satellites to relay data, as
Ccations Panel; and to some of the activities
:erials Processing in Space.* Substantially more
More analysis is also needed to define
:Quate to permit practical applications of space
potential.
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PHASES IN THE EVOLUTION OF SPACE SYSTEMS
USES OR APPLICATIONS
In the months immediately following the launch of the first man-made earth
satellite, the cnn:ern of the nation was with developing a capability to do things
in space, and the National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 accordingly placed
major emphasis on research and development assc,ciated with the exploration of
space. Space activities now range from research and development to operational
systems, so that a broader view of the scope of the national space program is
required. In its deliberations, the Panel on Institutional Arrangements identified
three distinct phases in the evolution of space systems, each requiring different
institutional arrangements. The phases are 11) research and development,
(2) transitional, and (3) operational.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PRASE
The R&D phase is that phase in which the required technology is acquired,
system characteristics are determined, experimental systems are developed and
launched, and the systems and technological capabilities are tested and evaluated.
Typically, in this phase scientific Principal Investigators (PI) suggest tech-
niques to be tested for their capability to aid in carrying out a particular dis-
ciplinary research interest. The PI -- an experimenter --- is; in fact, the "user" of
the space system in this phase, and the scientific community is encouraged by NASA
to participate in the PI process. At this stage, NASA has typically viewed as
additional "users" other federal agencies which have programs closely related to
the capabilities of the experimental space system: for example, the National Oceanic
and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) for weather, the Department c:e Agriculture
(USDA) for agricultural research, and the Department of the Inte7rlor (USDI) for
mineral resources, range management, and forestry. It should be noted that the
R&D phase is not always clearly defined, since users frequently consider the
early space systems to be providing operational information and; capabilities in
terms of their particular needs, when actually they are still regarded by the
the developers.as experimental..
TRANSITIONAL PHASE
Nearing the end of the RFD phase, user classes may begin to be recognized
and it may be possible to postulate or even define missions An important
5
constraint to further progress is that the capabilities of the technology and
the requirements of the potential users are not yet well matched.. The user
market is neither fully identified nor developed. There is then, what the Panel
defines as a transitional phase.
During the transitional, phase, the emphasis shifts from experiments in
technology to experiments in putting the capabilities of.the space.system to
practical use. Demonstration projects, which give potential users an opportunity
to try the new capabilities, are implemented but users do not have to abandon
conventional techniques and commit to dependence on the space system. Potential
users must test and evaluate the application of space systems to their particular
needs. Equipment and operating procedures advance out of the experimental stage
toward the "off-the-shelf" status needed for the operational phase, avid the
management and institutional arrangements make such a transition as well. The
t=:nrket -- the potential users and the manner in which they will use the new
capability -- becomes better deAned. in this phase preliminary benefits from
demonstration projects can be assessed to provide a basis for operational invest-
ment decisions.
OPERATIONAL PHASE
Toward the end of the transitional phase, it has been demonstrated that the
technology is reliable, key potential users have been identified, and capabil-
ities of the technology have been matched with user needs. The nature of
institutional.interaetions should have become apparent, and in some cases, the
number and activities of potential users should have become :fear. The system
is ready to enter into practical use. if it is to do so, however, an appro-
priate institutional framework is essential. questions - such as who is
responsible, who . pays, who has access to the service or the information which
the system will provide	 must be answered. The operational phase may require
-- particularly in the case of the Space Shuttle - that users who have unique
requirements justify their own payloads and pay certain costs. For an operational
earth resourcessy stem, where needs for many users must be integrated into pack-
ages, institutional arrangements will require prioritization of user requirements.
i
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SOME PAST EXAMPLES OF INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
FOR SPACE SYSTEMS USES OR APPLICATIONS
In considering institutional arrangements, it is appropriate to examine
some institutional axrangements which already exist or have existed in the past,
and which might serve as precedents or examples appropriate to one of the three
phases in the evolution of space systems. The Panel recognizes that few institu-
tional mechanisms fit the different p:Lases exactly, and that the perception of
the phase in which a given system falls may change with time and viewer (for
example, as cited earlier, a system which is viewed as experimental by the
developer may be perceived as operational by a user).
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT PH:'1SE
The Interagency Coordination Committee for the Earth Resources Survey
Program (ICCERSP), chartered by the Office of Management and Budget in 1972, 	 3
constitutes.a formalized mechanism for interagency.coordination of the earth
resources survey program -- a program which is now in the research and develop- 	 -i
ment stage, An Earth Resources Survey Program Review Committee (ERSPRC),
established in 1968, was a forerunner of ICCERSP but had fewer members and
slightly different objectives. The ICCERSP charter remains in effect until
early 1975. The Committee is chaired by the Deputy Administrator of NASA, and
includes members from NASA, USDA, U.S. Department of Commerce (DOC), DOD, USDI.',-
U.S. Department of State (USDS), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (USAGE), the
Environmental Protection.Agency(EPA), and, until its dissolution. in 1973, the
Office of Science and Technology COST). Official observers are appointed from
the Council on Environmental Quality, the National. Security Council, OMB and
the National Aeronautics and Space Council (until it was disbanded). The
charter provides that each user agency shall be responsible for .developing app,li
cations and test programs for evaluating and justifying the usefulness of earth
resources survey activities to the community it serves. Each agency also is
responsible (working with NASA as the lead 	 meetdevelo	 agency) for appropriate
Pdata dissemination to the citizens of the United' States and. abroad * User.. agencies..
g	 9
are defined as those which may potentially use earth observations data or infor-
mation, either to improve internal operations or as part of their services to
the public . in accordance with their established missions. With regard to
. 
the
Committee l s influence on funding of earth resources programs, it' should. be noted.:
that the charter provides that the Committee will coordinate the plans and pro-_
grams which comprise the national program and review and comment, on a
timely basis, on budgets for the various. elements. of the program.
7
The charter also provides that federal user agencies will continue to propose
and justify funding for space applications that are of interest to their
constituencies.
Some observations pertinent to the effectiveness of ICCERSP as an institu-
tional mechanism for assuring the exploration by research and development of
potential beneficial uses of space systems include:
The charter did not originally provide for consideration of
an operational system; a provision was added later to the effect
that the costs of moving toward an operational system should be
considered within existing resources;
The Committee has no full--time or independent staff; and
While the Committee includes representatives from many (but
not all) federal agencies having an interest in earth resources
programs, it does not include representatives from actual or
potential nonfederal users.
Another institutional arrangement, of very different scope, is the provision
of support in the R&D phase by the development agency (NASA) to agencies with
environmental responsibilities. An example is a current series of interagency
agreements between NASA and EPA. Here agreements are made between specific NASA
program offices or research centers and EPA program offices or field research
centers related to automobile engine emissions technology, as well as the sensor
technology for detecting or Measuring pollution,:and are supplemented by a set
of informal working relationships. Such institutional arrangements are in many
ways typical of those set up during the R&D phases of space systems, and tend
to be characterized as follows:.. (1) they are based on bilateral agreements
between two federal agencies; (2) they sometimes include transfer of funds from
one agency to another to carry out a specific experiment (but not to shift large
elements of program cost); (3) they imply that the user agency is voicing the
research interests and . needs of its constituency (imply because nonfederal users.
are represented in no other way); (4) by their nature, they require no independent
staff; and (5) they often are open-ended in that they remain in effect until the
research objective has been accomplished. (While termination dates may be
specified for administrative purposes, they are frequently and easily extended).
TRANSITIONAL PHASE
A basic agreement of 1964 between the U.S..Department of Commerce and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration concerning an operational meteoro-
logical satellite system had aspects related to both transitional and operational
phases. The agreement : established a basis for the U.S.: Weather Bureau to reim-
burse NASA for providing operational spacecraft and supporting technology for
the development of satellite meteorological programs Under this arrangement,
the Television Infrared Research Observational. Satellite (TIROS) series of satel-
lites was modified to meet operational needs; the TIROS series was later opera-..
tionally designated as Environmental Survey Satellites. Certain of the
8
Applications Technology Satellite (ATS) and NIMBUS series were covered under the
agreement. The 1964 agreement was superseded by a 1973 agreement designating
NOAA as the responsible agency within the Department of Commerce. The transition-
al phase, as defined by the Panel, occurred while the 1964 agreement was . in force.
The operational phase is now covered by the 1973 agreement.' The arrangement
provides for a Meteorological Satellite Program Review Board. It also provides;
that funds can be transferred from DOC to offset costs to NASA of support services.
It shouldbe noted that the Panel on Meteorology of the 1967.-68 summer
study* recommended that NASA continue RFD to measure atmospheric temperature,
moisture, winds, and cloud cover. Implementation of the recommendation is an
interesting illustration of the transitional phase in that the agreement (1) is
related to a single :application area (meteorology); .(2) specifies a -review board
between the two involved agencies; (3) uses fund transfers from the user agency
to reimburse NASA for support services; and (4) recognizes that NASA will con-
tinue funding for RFD during the transitional period.
Another significant institutional arrangement is-represented by the
Communications Satellites Act of 1962 (P.L. 87-624) which established the
Communications Satellite Corporation (COMSAT). This act assigns to NASA the
obligation to advise the Federal Communications Commission on matters relating
to the technical characteristics of communications satellite systems and desi"s..
This legislated requirement led the 1967-68 study panel on Point-to-Point Commu-
nications to conclude thitt "There are no alternatives to NASA's accepting-respon-
sibilities for further RFD because. NASA has a statutory obligation ... to provide
the technological support for the pertinent policy-making agencies of the govern
ment .... "** The need for NASA to maintain competence in satellite communications
was recognized by the Office of Telecommunications Policy in January 1974, in a
memorandum to all agencies within the Executive Branch, which.set.forth the
arrangements under which NASA would continue to provide technical support for
communications satellites.
The Communications Satellite Act of 1962, as a mechanism for institutional
arrangements, may be evaluated as follows: (1) it is a legislated mechanism,
carrying implications for new funding arrangements (while NASA would be reimbursed
by COMSAT for launch and support services, a funding arrangement is implied that
is qualitatively and legally different from usual interagency fund transfers);
(2) COMSAT decisions on program scope and priorities important to its own can-
stituency are taken outside the federal budget process; (3) the duration of the
arrangement is not fixed; (4) representation *** from nonfederal users is extensive
and is controlled by user organizations; (5) the mechanism itself does not 	 I
establish the basis whereby the entire scope of U.S; interests, such as those
of the Department of State are expressed, rather, these are expressed in separate
agreements with international organizations; and (6) the mechanism has limitations
as a policy example because of the nature of the technology involved, the U.S.
i
*National Research Council. UsefuZ AppZieations of Earth-oriented SateUitesr
Report of the Panel on Meteorology (Panel.4). National Academyof Sciences,
Washington, D.C., 1969.
**Report of the Panel on Point-to--Point Cormnunieations, (1969) p. S.
***This consideration relates less to the act as an instrument for transition and
more to the operational.
 nature of thero ram conducted after
	
'P g	 passage of the act,...	 i
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climate in 1962 regarding peaceful uses of space, and the clearly international
nature of the program.
OPERATIONAL PHASE 
The 1973 basic agreement mentioned in the previous section established a
3	 DOC-NASA Satellite Program Board. 	 This Board is a coordinating group with two
members and a co-chairman from each of the agencies, NASA and NOAA. 	 The agree-
ment provides that each.maj.or project initiated under the agreement shall require
a separate memorandum of understanding, stipulating fund transfers and other
joint responsibilities. 	 Disagreements which may arise are resolved by referral:
to higher authorities in both agencies. 	 This represents an institutional mecha-
nism for an operational system iahich (1) relies on 'fund transfers from the. user.
agency to reimburse support costs; (2) is not statutorily based (except insofar
as enabling legislation permits agencies to enter into such agreements).; (3) is
not of fixed duration. but subject to termination or modification by either agency
at any -time,; (4) specifies no direct involvement of nonfederal users; ' (5) implies
that the needs of the user community are expressed by NOAA as the prime user;
and (6) extends beyond the narrow scope (meteorology) of the previous agreement
to include environmental satellites.	 This last point.is .of interest because.,
while the agreement is categorized here as relating to the operational phase,
perhaps only activities relating to meteorology (and relating directly to the
superseded 1964 agreement) are actually operational. 	 Activities relating to
other areas are more properly classed as in the transitional or R&D phase.
J
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A 'PROPOSED INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
FOR SPACE SYSTEMS USES OR APPLICATIONS
TECHNICAL SUPPORT SERVICES
In examining how technical support services.might best be provided to the
user community, the Panel considered four key factors:
The technical expertise required,
The high capital investment involved,
The possible cost savings, and
The need to maintain a core capability, as required, to support
all users.
	
` {	 The factors involving technical expertise and high capital costs are self-
explanatory. The third factor -- possible cost savings	 while it relates to
the other factors as well, in this case is intended, to'identify the 'savings.
achieved by providing a common-use capability,.human or physical; which would be
under-utilized and would cost more if developed by each user to satisfy his own
requirements. The fourth factor is perhaps the most important of all. It is the
belief of the Panel on Institutional Arrangements that :access to s ace should be .
available to all users having the ability to pay. This is not intended to imply.	 j
the exclusion of others; some potential users may possess neither the technical'
ability nor the desire to develop their own operations capability. In many cases,
too, the need for a space-based operation may be a singular or infrequent require-
meat and thus not justify the development of an integral capability:. The Panel
believes that a core capability should be maintained to provide potential users	 ;	 {
with. an opportunity to.purchase support services as requ red,
The Panel recognizes that the Department of Defense must have its own space-
related facilities and technical capability for reasons of national. defense. The
existence of these facilities, capabilities, and resulting space  data is sometime
used as an. argument against the development of parallelsystems..for non-military
use. Unfortunately, security considerations OS pre-empting military requirements.
prevent the facilities, capabilities, and data from being available to meet cavil
needs. Joint use of facilities, capabilities, and data should certainly be
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encouraged. in areas in which national security is not violated, but some`duplica-
tion is unquestionably necessary to meet all of the nation's needs.
After considering the four factors, the panel has identified areas in which
technical support services to meet civil needs can best be provided by a single
civil organization.
	 The 'Panel concludes that NASA is the logical and appropriate
..	 organization to provide these services and believes that NA.'W can do this in a
manner consistent with its present operating made.
i
Launch Operations
The launch operation is a unique function, technically.demanding . and involy-
ang complex interactions between such elements as a standardized launch vehicle,
checkout and launch facilities, range and tracking networks, and range safety.
The management of these interrelated activities demands the services of a single
launching organization.
	 The present mode of operation, in which individual hard-
ware elements are checked out by the user organization and then turned over to
the launching organization for final processing and launch, is well developed and
i	 appears adequate for continuing use.	 In all launches of U.S. spacecraft to date,,
the service has been.. p ovided by either: NASA or DOD.. The . Panel; feels the :division
of this responsibility between these two agencies is appropriate and should be
continued in the future.
Spacecraft Development
Operations in space involve long duration exposure of .the.systems to.zero
gravity and total vacuum.	 The systems must depend upon internally generated
power and must have a highly reliable capability for sophisticated thermal con-
trol, data acquisition and handling, communications, and attitude control..	 Design
and development.of these systems is very specialized and technically demanding.
Negotiating contracts., defining systems, developing specifications, monitoring
technical compl.iance, and identifying and resolving problems all are technical
and management specialties which even the most sophisticated users outside of
W	
NASA and DOD should not be required.to ,develop independently and can not be
expected to develop easily.
	
For these reasons the Panel believes that non-
defense services in these areas should be made available by NASA to all users 	 j
.`	 requiring them or that NASA should at least be prepared to provide appropriate
advisory support,
Asp art of its role in support of spacecraft development, NASA should offer
alternative packaging and mission planning data., and . define corresponding costs
to the usex.	 NASA, warking simultaneously with users from DOD, fxom science and
technology . organizations, and from organizations.with broader applicat ons.	 also:
should develop integrated (that is, combining needs of several users)` hardware
i	 packages and mission time lines (schedules;.of events and the precise time at
E	
which their occurrence is planned).	 More sophisticated users and those employing
i	 ahead	 develo ed s acc s s-ems should be allowed to. urchase:fewer of thesey .	 P	 P	 r	 P
services than less sophisticated users and those who are still. defining and evoly-
i	 ing their hardware.
Provisions should also be made to account for the varying requirements of
federal	 other-public' andprivate sectors.
1.2
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1Payload
NASA should work on a cost -reimbursable basis with various users in the
definition and development of payload packages. This support service should be
provided in a manner similar to that outlined for spacecraft development.
Ground Facilities
f
Certain large and unique ground facilities are required is the launch. and
operation of spacecraft. These facilities include the launch complex, the.track-
ing and data-acquisition network, and the mission operations complex. In mew of
the unique. and .sophisticated nature . of these . faclits ys and their use, the Panel
believes that it is appropriate for NASA to provide. and operate the facil t ese
Additionally, certain other development facilities wii.ch are unique and.non
competitive, such as thermal vacuum chambers structural and"vibration test
facilities and appropriate simulators,. should be recognized as " national 'facilities
and managed by NASD: employing institutional arrangements similar to those nota
involved with wind tunnels.
Spacecraft Command and Control
Whereas the need for unified technical support services is clear, the areas
of responsibility in spacecraft command and control are not so clearly defined.
On one hand, the high capital investment and the specialized technical capabili-
ties involved support the need for common facilities for spacecraft command"and
operation. This 'view is supported by the fact that many users may require data
from a single spacecraft and that problems related to interaction and different
requirements (in sensors, for example) may be difficult to resolve. On the other
hand, in the future many user agencies will be involved in this activity in a
major way and on a continuing . basis (for example, NOAA'i;n the operation of weather
satellites) so that some user agencies probably should develop„their own capability,
A concept of user command and control is supported by the fact that detailed
knowledge of'the technical asp ects of the mission is required in order to operate
and control the spacecraft. Usually the user is most involved in and knowledge-
able o£ this part of the mission. It appears, then, that the issue : of spacecraft: {
command and control should be decided on a case-by-case _basis after consideration
is given to the points raised here as well as to other issues which may affect a
particular decision.
	
I
Data Processing
The case of data handling is similar to the question: of spacecraft command
and control in that it does not appear to be a function which clearly should be
performed by NASA or clearly should' always` be left -to users. In favor of-centraliza- 	 i
tion^ %are the high costs of data. acquisition, calibration, conversion to engineer-
ing units, storage, and analysis. For users with. low volume requirements which
are not time-critical, a centralized organization appears"most,logical. In the
experimental phase, data processing should be a service available " from NASA to"
_
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all potential users in order to assure open access to space generated data. A
mechanism toimplement such a policy in one specific area is discussed later.
However, users may find it advantageous to'develop their own capabilities :•Then
they have a continuing nee,` Far large amounts of data or Tequire detailed knowl-
edge of the end use of. the data in order to properly analyze it. Other factors
that may lead individual users to establishing their own capabilities for data
handling include (l) need for direct access to raw data (2) proprietary or sensi-
tive featuxes of the data,
of the data in some contro
or sensitive international
Recommendation
.(3) tir.i! sensitivity-.and urgency, and. (4) possible
.
 use
1 or monitoring sense which could have legal, control,
implications.
It is recommended that, with the exceptions or quaZ fications noted
in the foregoing discussion, NASA provide the teehncaZ'support services
identified.
DATA MANAGEMENT
Earth observations by satellite-borne sensors generate large quantities of
data, and thus pose unique problems of institutional arrangements. The data
serve many users, with differing requirements for data acquisition, data proces-
sing, dissemination, data formats, and timeliness. The Panel believes that
decentralized systems for data processing, matching user capabilities and needs,
should.
 and
.
 _ are certain.to evolve as space systems for earth . resource surveys
attain the operational phase. Decentralized data systems will permit meeting the
unique needs of many users, and may provide better data processing capabilities
at dower cost.
The. Panel emphasizes that every effort must be made to assure that users of
s;ace data in specific ` disciplines are not so tightly tied to.paxticular data
ources that they are precluded from using the data acquired from space systems
cn diverse ways not anticipated by the particular data dissemination source. For
exariple, only recently has it become. widely appreciated that the data generated.
by meteorological satellites could have a strong impact on agriculture. The Panel
rAutesparti ciil:arly the comments of the 1974 study of the Panel. on Weather, and
Climate* in relation to.this point.
T	 Unique Deeds
The .Panel believes. that. experimental use of data provided by ERTS-1. has
!	 demonstrated the broad applicability and many benefits of remotely sensed data.
aunique to his area of resource management, often regional and peculiar to specific
organizational needs. Broad applicability and specialized methods of application
are placing many demands upon the current system for disseminating . LANDSAT data
In the future, a single centralized data facility (such as the USDI Earth Resources
Observation System Data Center) probably will be unable to meet processing needs
efficiently and within the time frame many users require.
Data Processing Capability
Data processing technology has been in a period of explosive growth, marked
by increasing capability and decreasing cost. Increasing capability is needed
to handle pxo^ected data acquisition rates, to perform corrective p;
functions, and to provide output of a variety of standard products for analysis
by individual users. Decreasing cost will enable users'to perform more computer
analysis and to enter the. data flow at a point where value received exceeds
investment cost. Ground stations in foreign cozmtries are prototypes of special-
ized (agency, regional., or special-interest) data centers.which will come into
being after data continuity is assured. Decreasing costs and unique processing
needs combine to encourage decentralized and specialized data centers;
Data Flow
The current policy on data dissemination provides open access to all earth
resources data by marketing them through federal centers, principally the USD][
facility at . Sioux.Falls, South Dakota. Figure I is a simplified flow chart for
current LANDSAT data. Demonstrated benefits, unique user needs, 'competitive
.advantages to nations or commercial firms, and steadily decreasing costs of data
processing will result in more users of earth resources data. Some,of these
users wi.11;.be pxepared..to make the investment necessary to acquire data directly
from the spacecraft. Some nations have :already.done so,
in the R&D phase of earth observations, data collection and.dissemination
Were centralized, users were few. (arid they were principally scientific users),
and benefits were being developed and demonstrated. In the transitional phase,
decentralization becomes: necessary and has`alxeady begun; Fore gn :data centers
are receiving and processing data and government agencies and commercial fires
in this country are increasing their processing and analysis capabilities.
Acquisition of data directly from the satellite by some users is likely.to .occur
eventually. Continuingrestrictions' on acqui:si;tioi of data or encoding of data
would, add complexity to the system and be of uncertain effectiveness. Open and
equal opportunity for access to data should foster program growth and extend
benefits..
Data systems and operating precedents for the processing and dissemination
of meteorological data are well established and effecti:•e. Continued advances
in meteorology and earth resources and related satellite technologies Should
bring inexeasxng. opportunities :for data. exchange. Agriculture and water
`	 resources management are expected to benefit substantially from advances in
weather forecasting, especially from precipitation forecasting and monitoring.
is
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Meteorology will benefit from the use in earth resources programs of sensors of
higher resolution.
Recommendations
The Panel on Institutional Arrangements offers the following recommendations
in the area of data management:
(1) Aat the present policy of equal and open access should be con-
tinued, and should be extended to permit acceso at any Zevel in
the multi-tiered data flow system.
(2) The price of data obtained by users from federally-operated data
centers should cover the cost of processing in the research and
development phase and a share of the capital investment in the
:
	
	 operational phase. Priority orquick-response processing should
be provided at a price commensurate with added costs. Pricing
should reflect the broad issues discussed later in this report.
(3) A master archival system, operated by the U.S. Government, should
provide a repository for all earth resources data collected by
satellites and federally-operated aircraft. This master archival
system should provide standardized formats for data processing
and retrieval.
(4) The Space Applications Board . of the National Research Council
should explore means for promoting beneficial and timely inter-
change of technologies and data between earth resources programs
and meteorology.
RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT RESPONSIBILITIES
The National Aeronautics and Space Act clearly assigns to NASA responsibil
ity for research and development of space systems hardware. It is generally
agreed that this charge applies to work done during the RFD phase of space systems
evolution as that phase has been ` defined earlier. However, major issues have
arisen..within the Executive Branch about whether federal support. of RFD to. improve
capabilities and applications needs to continue during the transitional and opera-	 i
tional phases and after significant operational uses are being made of existing
space systems.
During.the transitional phase, a well defined market is:not available even
technologythough  applicable to various uses has already been demonstrated. In
such a situation it is obvious that only limited, if any, incentive exists for
private investment. Even when a space system is operational., incentives for
further RaD investment by non--federal governmental or. by .private. users may. not
exist.
Various factors may contribute to the lack of investment in followup RFD,
PiTst the benefits . of s aces stem.a lications are spread among many users.:	 p	 Y	 PP ^	 -
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In such a circumstance, while the total benefit may be large, the di ect individ-.
ual benefit is too small to make it worthwhile for any one user to undertake a
significant R&D investment. Aggregation of user investments would probably be
needed for broadly based follow-up R&D. Antitrust laws and various federal
policies, however, may inhibit such cooperative efforts. In addition, as
described earlier, aggregation of a diverse user constituency is difficult. Also,
an organization, whether it be private or governmental, operating an existing
system and applying its results will generally continue to rely on that system
in order to amortize fully an investment already made instead of undertaking
operations with an improved system. Further, the tendency is to continue use of
a present system unless the . new system offers substantial opportunities for
increased market and reasonably early return on investment.. Improvements that
are justified by public needs and that are directed principally to the public
good,-on the other hand, are not normally initiated with private funds. This
lack of incentive for advanced R&D is particularly evident in fields where com-
petitive arrangements have not yet evolved and also inhere market opportunities
and advantages are still small or uncertain.
It is not clear at this time how many satellites will be needed in the
operational phase to meet continuing requirements for the wide .variety of earth
resources applications which must be expected. Private manufacturers will have
little or no incentive to fund RFD unless they can see that large numbers of
systems will be needed and that they will have a reasonable chance of acquiring
enough of a market share to recoup R&D costs. It does not now seem.likely that
they will do so even in the operational phases of space systems since their
market share will probably continue low and sporadically fluctuating. It appears,
furthermore, that an incentive for the private community to invest in RFD will
not exist in the transitional phase since, by definition, a market is not yet
available and encouragement of user interest, involvement and organization is
implied.
The Panel therefore concludes that some mechanism moist be defined to assure
continuing improvement in space systems at least during the transitional phase
since analysis indicates that potential benefits to users may ultimately be
derived from such improvements. 'The Panel believes there is logic in continuing
to rely on NASA to organize and manage this followup R&D. It remains, however,
to determine how such activity should be funded and how to.assure user involve-
ment in program definition.
NASA obviously has a responsibility,_-in accordance with the Space Act, to
define and budget for its own RFD needs. The Pane. believes that during the
transitional phase, while institutional arrangements are being worked out, users
should play an increasingly strong role in the definition of R&D programs plan-
ned and conducted. by NASA. During this phase NASA should continue to budget for
the R&D.. (The Panel will propose. later in this report an institutional mechanism
which it believes can help to assure user participation in' defining . R&D programs.)
During the operational phase of space systems, a different approach seems
appropriate, even though a lack of Incentive for private investment may°also be
evident in certain cases. Fn.the operational.phase,.systems are developed and
a user commmity exists. Satell=ites. owned and operated by. :govermient.agencies .
or byprivate organizations are in place. At this stage,, certain_ improvements,
specifically aimed at public benefits, may be needed, When these improvements
are clearly . within the responsibility of existing federal agencies, it .may be
18
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iexpected that these agencies will provide the funds for the needed R&D. When
the RFD requirements are net within the jurisdiction of any single agency, how-
ever, they must be identified by some mechanism (such as that proposed later in
this report). In these cases it appears appropriate for NASA to respond to
identified needs by including R&D within its budget. The same is true of broad
national needs. When the private sector is irvolved in an operational system
or a user has identified R&D needs for such a system, the following alternative
arrangements are possible:
1. The private organization itself can conduct the work or it may
reimburse NASA if NASA does the work.
2. When the magnitude of the risk precludes direct private investment
in RFD but the federal government agrees that potential: benefits
are of significant value, the government may undertake the RFD on
a payback, royalty, or user-charge basis, designed eventually to
recover the cost.
3. The work may be done with joint private and federal funding within
a system in which users pay back the investors.
The federal government will have royalty-free rights to the systems derived
from the federal R&D program.
These arrangements are outlined as possibilities for assuring that this
still-new field of space technology continues to develop and does not become
stagnant after first applications. Our foresigh •c is not considered adequate to
anticipate future benefits, market situations, etc., that may develop. Great
care is needed to assure that lack of private investment in RFD does not halt
the continuing improvement of systems while they are being usefully applied.
Also, as further uses are defined and as replacement of less efficient techniques
appears possible, development of needed improvements must be assured. In addi-
tion, the Panel believes that there will be a continuing need for scientific
research which should continue to be supported by NASA through its established
Principal Investigator system to evaluate the feasibility of significant
advances.
SOME ALTERNATIVE INSTITUTIONAL ARRANGEMENTS
FOR FEDERAL ADMINISTRATION
Several major institutional options for determining and coordinating .
federal policy with respect to practical use of space systems have been consid-
ered and are discussed here. The Panel recognizes that many variations of each
option are possible, including combinations oftwo or more of the arrangements
discussed. However, the options are presented here as alternatives.
It is assumed that satellite applications will be perceived as increasingly
valuable; otherwise, most of the need for new organizational structure dis-
appears. Nevertheless, the current diversity of formal and ad hoc interagency
arrangements for matching user needs with supplier capability underlines the
importance of formalizing an operating framework tha' anticipates a growing need
19
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for consistency in interagency policy. It is further assumed that organization-
al arrangements will need ':o adapt to the evolution of programs from the R&D
phase through a transitional stage to the operational mode. Finally, it is
assumed that NASA will remain the source of launching and related services,
regardless of arrangements for user participation or funding..
Principal Functions
The Panel believes that a central federal administration is required to
perform the following principal functions:
Providing general policy direction:. Some focal point is required
where general questions of program initiation, emphasis, growth,
effectiveness, and duration can be debated and decided, subject to
review by the President of the United States.
Setting priorities: Where there are competitive demands for
limited facilities, products, or space missions (and all proposals
fall within established guidelines) sore authority must determine
under what conditions and in what order competitors are entitled
to use available resources.
Maintaining open access to data: The size and structure of the
market for the output from space systems will be largely deter-
mined by the ease of access to data and by the extent of govern-
mental commitment either to process the data as required by
various users or to furnish technical assistance (and perhaps
financial aid) to train users to do their own processing.
Assuring continuity and standardization: If it is to attract
potential users, any system must provide a structured process
for changes, improvements or termination, and, even in the R&D
stage, must include some assurance of continuity and use of
accepted units or data formats.
E'stabZishing prices: A central mechanism must determine how
prices and user charges will be established for data.orinforma-
tion products, use of facilities and other services. It must be
recognized that the mechanism established for pricing will. probably
play a significant role in whatever international structure evolves
for the application of space systems
Assuring fomaZ contact betWeen.users and suppliers In addition
to the inevitable and largely desirable plethora of informal points
of contact between suppliers and users of space technology, there
must be some formal structure for exchange of ideas, proposals,
criticisms,; and evaluation. It is. particularly; important to
guarantee regular and effective access for important users within
nonfederal governmental agencies, for example, within. states,
metropolitan areas, counties, and cities. }
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Coordinating and eva4uatzng program deve_Z.opment and implementa-
tion: There must bea central point, where program implementation
is carefully considered and inhere integration is assured in the
likely ovent that more than one agency is involved in implemen-
tation..
Encouraging non-federaZ invoZvement and investment: There must be
a.steady increase, particularly in:.the transitional stages, in the
amount of non--federal capital applied to programs aimed at market--
able products and services. The maximization of this.$ as well:, as
imaginative institutional innovation to provide for joint public
and.przvate ventures, should be entrusted . to a central body capable
of involving operating agencies as required.
The Panel examined in some depth the advantages and disadvantages of three
options for an institutional arrangement designed to perform the functions just
discussed.
Option I - Central Authority in An Existing Federal Agency
Option.I consists of placing in one of the existing..Executive Departments
or agencies having a major interest in useful applications of space systems, the
primary responsibility for performance of the required functions and the deci-
sion .authority, subject to appeal to or review by the President when disagree-
ments arise or allocative decisions are required. This designation would not.
rearrange present assignments of operating responsibilities or location of sub-
stantive expertise. It would simply establish a leadership.role (a lead agency)
with final authority and responsibility much .as.the State.Department operates..in
the field of foreign affairs. This option would require formal arrangements for
other agencies and nonfederal users to be consulted pxi.or to decisions and pro-
visions for the lead agency to be informed about action on its decisions and
the results thereof.
Advantages resulting from the choice of Option I include:
1. A focal point, now missing, would be provided for the establishment
of policy related to practical use o£ space systems. ..Clear .lines.of authority
and responsibility would be established, little start-up time and expense would
be required, and ultimate decision authority would be vested in one person
the head of the agency -- subject only to appeal to the President.
2. If NASA were the designated agency, a close relationship would be
assured between policy decisions on uses and the realities of operational and
technological capabilities. Somewhat more expeditious progress from proposal to
policy decision to execution might:be achieved.°because a single agency would
control the entire process. NASA itself not being a user,. its substantive
neutrality might lessen fears that some specialized discipline , might 'get unfairk	
advantage in the competition fox funds. Also, there would seem to be some pos-
S bi.lity of greater :financial suppoTt j at ,Least :for.. MD. projects, since the
lead agency would be expected to. seek appropriation of a larger share of funds
2.1
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than the other participating agencies and NASA has, at least to this point, a
history of relative success in getting financial support,
3, If NASA were not the lead agency, a closer and more mutually informed
relationship might develop with at least some major users. The lead agency`
would presumably have facilities. for. and experience. in delivering services direct-
ly to. the public. There should be less danger that the program would be driven
by technological capabilities and aspirations rather than by realistic prospects
of uses with reasonable cost benefit potential. The odds would improve that the
lead agency would ingest in systematic training of present and potential users
and thereby increase- the market for data products, at least in the agency's own
field,
4. There would be great bureaucratic strength in having the point of
coordination in an established and functioning agency with line responsibilities,
budget leverage, congressional and public constituencies and direct communica-
tion with the White House,
On the other hand, disadvantages of Option I include the following:
I. Jealousies and discontents in the agencies not chosen as lead:.agency
and their constituencies might make Option I unworkable in practice. gefusal
of agencies (and their congressional constituencies) to accept subordinate status
could lead to. pressure for splintering of functions and systems and for multiple
exemptions from the writ of central authority.
2. There could be widespread worry that programs would be biased in favor
of the substantive specialty of the chosen agency. The effects could be. unfortu-
nate if the .agency actually indulged such bias-;5 or unduly penalized its own users
in order to appear to remain neutral.
3. If NASA were the lead agency, there could be a continuation.and'perhaps
even a worsening of the gulf that now separates present and potential users from
decision and management processes except within small and informal networks of
individuals whom NASA now consults. There might be very strong pressures to
emphasize programs that. pursue theoretically defined technology. ,capabil ties.
Also, a.ny other agency would be a professionally familiar and acceptable judge
of the merits of proposals in at least one specialized..user field. NASA has
recognized expertise only in aeronautical and space technology and related`
ground.support systems, in space science$ and in management of large or .complex
projects. Finally, NASA would be taken out of the service role it has tradi-
tionally considered most conducive for effective development and operation of
technology.
4. If NASA were not the lead agency, there would be a greater possibility
suppliers,impasse between users and su pl'ers, Also, because substantially less exper-
tise in space technology exists in agencies other than NASA, large-scale tech-
nical txainin& of the agency s s personnel would!.be requir d or the agency, would .
need to hire a substantial number of new people. E
t
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S. There are.dangers inherent in relying on the budget and appropriation
process of any one agency as the principal support for space application pro-
grams. The size and nature of the effort could be greatly affected by a few
individuals (for example; the chairman of a congressional appropriations commit-
tee, an OMB unit chief) whose attitudes toward the lead agency might be deter-
mined by factors other than the effectiveness of the programs but who could be
extremely influential in deciding the nature and scale of approved investments.
Option II w Central Authority in New Federal Agency
Option II assumes the creation of'a new agency whose sole purpose is to
perform functions discussed at the beginning of this section. Operational
responsibilities of other agencies would remain undisturbed. An analogous
example . may.be the original form. of the Office of Economic Opportunity (OEO)
(excluding its operating functions) or the role of the U.N. Development Program
vis-a-vis the U.N. special agencies. In both these cases, the principal leverage
of the coordinating agency has been that the bulk of the funds involved flowed
through it. This would have to be the case for Option II as well. To be effec--
tive the new agency might have to be placed in the Executive Office of the.
President.
Advantages of choosing Option II include the following:
1. A new agency would carry no historical baggage of substantive bias
nor any scars from past bureaucratic controversies. It could.be the focal point
for developing a new multidisciplinary constituency for practical applications
of,space.systems as the trendcontinues toward overlapping needs and uses.
2. Interagency jealousies should be minimized as should dangers of sub-
stantive bias. Existing agencies might find a new agency easier to accept than
a lead agency selected from among them. The objectivity of a new agency should
be more credible to the President, the Congress, and the public than that.of an
existing agency.
3.. A new agency would leave NASA with the responsibilities for service
and technological development that it has always preferred.
Option II appears to have the following disadvantages:	 4
1. Current budgetary considerations and the attitude of the general public
toward priority for space programs make Presidential and/or Congressional
approval of a new agency very dubious. Additional costs would be unavoidable
and highly visible as new appropriations were requested and debated.. Start•-up
time would be considerable.
2. A new :agency wouldprobably be.in.a weak position in dealing with the
well-established Executive Department; and agencies, including, NASA.. The OEfl 1
example is not an encouraging one, even though, the agency leverage has included
allocation of billions of dollars.
3. A new agency would create unpredictable new patterns of user aggrega-
tion, Congressional responsibility, and constituency formation, a new environ-
ment which could as easily be unfavorable to progress in practical use of space
systems as it could be favorable. It would also add to the image of complex
and generally impenetrable federal agencies which already discourages many
present and potential users.
4. A new agency might be strongly attacked, as central allocative age n
cies frequently are, by specialized constituencies. In such a case, as a new
agency, it would be at a disadvantage in having no tradition of established and
indispensable functions.
Option III - Central Authority in Statutory Interagency Committee
The most logical implementation of Option III would be to build on the
present Committee (ICCERSP) which at present deals only with earth resources
survey programs. ICCERSP was established pursuant to an OMB directive which
gave it official life through the beginning of calendar year 1975. Chaired by
the NASA Deputy Administrator, who is charged with acting as an impartial modera-
tor and not as a representative of NASA, the Committee consists of assistant
secretary ox comparable level representatives from major user agencies. Its
principal charge. has been to draw up a comprehensive plan. for federal investments
to be used in observations of earth resources. Issues of general policy raised
by one or more members are discussed and the Committee performs limited analyses
It has no veto nor other formal power nor is there any mandate that issues be
brought before it. Nevertheless, 'there is evidence that its deliberations carry
some weight in NASA and other participating agencies, despite the fact that OMB
has twice rejected draft plans it has proposed.
Advantages offered by Option III include the following:
1. An interagency committee with broad representation should minimize
agency feelings of exclusion and professional subordination.
2. The arrangement should require only minor new expense and start-up
time. Compared with the legislation. which would be required for other options,
an authorization for such a committee would probably be the most likely to be
adopted by the Congress. at this time.
,li
:1. An interagency Committee would help to keep all participants aware
of priorities and problems in different fields and might reduce tendencies to
parochialism.
i
4. No major adjustments would be required in the existing structures of
agency and Congressional constituencies, in appropriation structures ., or in
operating -responsibilities.
5,. It would provide a forum for debate and a, clear point of decision on
all issues raised.
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The following disadvantages may result from Option III:
10 interagency committees are notoriously weak structures for decision
making. They -rend to be useful forums but not effective in decision making
because they are rigidly structured and rather indefinitely linked to operational
control. They can often be ignored with impunity by.strong agencies, even when
their representatives serve on such committees.
2. Action within a committee format might be slower on the average than
with other .options.. There might also be a danger. of. "lowest-common-denominator''
policy formulation which could compromise program substance.
3. The position of the chairman might become delicate and difficult as
data become more valuable and competition more intense. The chairman probably
could not function unless he had the personal and visible confidence of the
President. Most successful examples of interagency committees with decision_
making powers have been chaired by cabinet officers or members of the
Presidental staff.In this arrangement the Committee often is. dominated by. the
chairing agency. However, the National Aeronautics and Space Council was an
example in which the chairman was not a line operating official and a lack of
impact was apparent.
4. The Committee might be less effective than other suggested structures
in bridging the gap between users and suppliers. Federal agencies would -pos-
sibly screen the needs and suggestions of users and might receive little
challenge from other agencies who might wish reciprocal treatment when their
own interests were at staked
Some Options Not Analyzed
Several arrangements are regarded as possibilities too remote for serious
consideration. within the time available at the study. Among these are the
following
1. A multi-tiered governmental entity (far example a federal-state-
metropolitan-local governmental.construct) with some form of proportionate
representation from all levels.
':	 1
2. An independent public-benefit corporation, including representation
from several levels of government and from the private sector. . (It should be
noted that such a corporation was considered'by the Panel on Agriculture,
Forest, and Range* and is discussed.in_the report of that Pane..)
s
3o An organization which includes representatives of foreign. governments
and/or corporations,
i
*Panel on Agriculture, Forest, and Range. Practicat Applications
-
of Space Systems,'
Supporting Paper a: Report of the PaneZ on AgricuZture, Forest and Range. Report
to the Space'
 Applications Board, National Research Council National Academy of
Sciences, Washington, D.C., 1975.
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4. Allocation of central functions to OMB, the National Science
Foundation, a re-established independent Office of Science Advisor to the
President, or some other element of the Executive Office.
S. Division of central functions among several existing operating agencies,
A Proposal for an Institutional Mechanism
E
I	 Bxtended discussion of .,the options has led .the Panel on Institutional.
I	 Arrangements to two conclusions concerning the possible options for determining
and coordinating federal policy and implementing programs to meet user needs 'in
`	 applications of space technology:
L No practicable option is free ofdefects or risks.
2. The urgent need for effective performance of the eight central
functions is best stet, under present circumstances, by a . variant
of Option III, a statutory interagency committee..
Accordingly, the Panel recommends that a National Council for Space
.Applications be established by act of Congress.
Implementation of the Proposed Institution
The Panel fully recognizes that much in history supports skepticism about
an interagency committee, particularly one which must include representation
from most of the large federal agencies. There are, however, examples of such
committees that have been reasonably effective. The Panel believes, for example,
that the history of ICCERSP provides some reason for confidence that a pattern 	 1
of cooperation among agencies interested in space applications has been estab-
lished which may carry over into a broader structure. Since ICCERSP as stxuc-
tuxed has serious inadequacies Whi ch preclude broadening its mandate. by simple
executive action, the Panel believes that the National Council for Space 	 a
Applications must have statutory authorization-. The Panel strongly believes
that the Council cannot function: within the federal . bureaucracy. and deal
effectively with controversial issues unless it has a full and specific mandate
from the Congress. It should be established by statute and charged with
responsibility for the eight central functions for all practical applications
of space systems: general policy direction, priority setting, maintenance of
open access to data, assurance of continuity and standardization, pricing,
establishing formal contact between users and suppliers, coordination of
implementation and evaluation of program development, and encouragement of non
federal involvement and investment. As in: al1 federal executive office programs,
this authority will be subject to the review and approval o£ the President.
We also believe. effective performance of the proposed Council requires statu-
Cory provisions for the following:
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1. Expansion of membership so that the Council includes as participating
members all federal agencies with legitimate and substantial interests in the
application of space technology. This probably should include most Executive
Departments, NASA, the National Science Foundation, and other independent
agencies. A precise list should be worked out as part of the authorizing 'legis-
lation. The Panel also believes that state and local governmental agencies
should participate and that the law should direct the Council to evolve effective
and equitable means of assuring their representation. 'These agencies should
acquire voting status as soon as possible and certainly within a very few years.
The statute should specifically prescribe that, in the Meantime, state and local
observers must be invited to all Council meetings, whether open or executive
sessions.
2. Designation of the .chairman since, de—zpite the reasonableness of the
case for an independently appointed chairman, the Panel believes that the rele-
vance and effectiveness of the Council will be best served by a statutory
designation.of the NASA.Administrator as chairman. We believe he has a strong
position as an operating official, an incentive for space application programs,.
and impartiality among users. Experience has suggested that it can be feasible
to vest the authority for a government-wide leadership role in the head of an
existing operating agency provided distinction between the two positions is
maintained. In the case of the proposed Council the distinction can be rein-
forced if the Chairman does not also serve as the NASA representative on the
Council. The role of the Chairman should be objective leadership and should
include as needed his acting.as a moderator.
3. Establishment of independent staff which should be small and profes-
sional with no bureaucratic allegiance to or dependence upon any member agency.
The staff, under Council direction, should be empowered to prepare agendas,
perform analyses, and coordinate the activities of operating agencies.
4. Specific responsibility for user involvement, in that the Council
should be charged with (1) building a nationwide process whereby user views are
solicited, aggregated, and taken into account, (2) determining the U.S, role in
such a process worldwide, and (3) developing a procedure by which, where possible,
non-federal interests gradually assume control and funding of space systems
and their applications as they become operational. Delegating these responsibil-
ities to the Council does not imply that weakening connections between operating
agencies and the user community is necessary or desirable. The Panel believes
that a central body with a broad mandate and perspective can help effectively in
phases of user.involvement that now are somewhat neglected.
5	 Appropriations administered by the Council for financing experimental
programs in institutional development. Many of the end users of space-derived 	 3
information or services will be personnel in state and local governments, and
in business and industry, who have little knowledge of or interest in space
systems. For the data or services to be used effectively, however, these people
must be aware of what is available, its usefulness, and.they must have the xnowl
edge and skills to put it to pxao:ical use. It is essential, too, that they be 	 3
involved in making their needs known, to help in matching requirements with the
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capabilities of the space systems. Thus, in carrying out its mandate, the
Council should . budget a small allocation of funds  for experimental institutional
development programs	 programs aimed at strengthening the capability of non-
federal uses to participate effectively in the useful application of space
systems. The programs should be carried out not by the Council but by appro-
priate federal agencies.
6. Public reporting, in that the Council should be required to prepare
fox the Congress an annual report summarizing major issues and decisions and
outlining future plans. and. assessing future. implications, The Panel feels that
a strong commitment to open debate and full disclosure has been one of the
strengths of the U.S. space program. Interim reports could be requested by the
Congress at any time.
7. Establishment of specialized subgroups which, in order to function
effectively in each of the specialized disciplines for which space technology
applications are useful, should include working.- level officials from the
agencies most concerned with each field of application. Specific subgroups
could be set up when involvement and development are fairly clear (for example,
in communicatuons) and the Council should be empowered to establish such groups
as it feels appropriate. The Council also should be empowered and encouraged
to delegate to duly authorized subgroups appropriate operating and decision
functions. This provision for a substructure should reduce the multiplicity of
committees, panels, and task forces that have evolved in the past to meet the
institutional needs which now will be met by the Council..
Given these statutery provisions, it is the judgment of the Panel that a
National Council can perform the central functions which the Panel feels are
vital to sound programs of space applications, The Council will not displace
any current or future operating agency nor will it in any sense eliminate the
normal budget process. It should have flexibility and accept readily the need
to adjust its role according to the -requ rements of R&D,. transitional, and
operational phases. The goal should be to provide a vital center. and a basis
point of reference for a constantly evolving program. With this goal_ and a
strong sense of common purpose, we believe that the federal and non-federal
suppliers and users can join together in a responsible operational arrangement
that. exercises the care needed in developing appl.icatiors of space systems and
at the same time, realize their full potential.
INVOLVEMENT OF NON-FEDERAL USERS
The Panel has recognized the evidence of problems in the involvement of
non-federal users in applications of space systems to planning, decision making,
and providing and regulating public and private services, It has focused on...
the roles and functions of various users in the planning, design and develop-
ment,'test and evaluation, and implementation of such applications. It specifi-
cally has addressed institutional arrangements, developments, and realignments
that can foster effective involvement of non-- federal users in the decision
process and matte it possible for -them to use such applications more effectively
and extensively.
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It should be noted that the guidelines for the 1974 summer study provided
by the Space Applications Board included the following limitations:
Major focus was to be on the applications of space systems; "spin-
offs" and utilization of technologies developed as-part of the
space program were to be treated only. peripherally.
The question.of basic research and science activities was not a
subject of the study.
Consideration in this discussion is limited to the distinction between private
and public non-federal user groups. It is clear that these users fall into many
categories, such as operating agencies, planning and support agencies, and
executive management agencies in'both the public and private sectors:as well as
elected policy-making officials in the legislative and executive branches of
government and corporate policy officials in the private sector. It is also
clearthat each such category of users will relate differently to the applica-
tions process - and any eXtrapolation and refinement of the general treatment here
should accommodate such differences.
Several additional assumptions were made by the Panel, as follows:
An effective space applications program must integrate the innova-
tive process throughout, from RFD planning to widespread use;
The pattern. of user concern and. involvement follows the pattern of
investment and information requirements illustrated in the invest-
ment decision model of the _Panel on Costs and 'Benefits*, that is.,
both increase from ROD through the operational stage; and
The changing nature of federal-state-local fiscal and prograan
responsibilities requires changing federal-state-local relation-
ships in research and technology, more effective and pervasive
application: of research and technology in domestic problem areas.,
and changes in the extent.and nature of technical assistance'needetl
by state and local governments.
Major User Concerns
The desire for (and the nature of) involvement by non-federal users varies
93
within each of the three phases of space systems .evolvement. Institutional
arrangements for technical support functions are of relatively little concern
to either public or
 private users at any phase, if the functions are being pro-
vided. Of course .,. however., several .policy:.ques:-tions.such as who pay.--. pricing:
mechanisms, and access to such services are. of major iMPO^rtance''to both public.^
and private users. Institutional arrangements for the conduct of RFD in space
*Panel on Costs and Benefits. P.racticaZ App cations of Space. Systems;` Supporting.
Paper 11: Report of the PaneZ on Costs and Benefits. Report to the Space Appli-
cations Board, National Research Council. 'National Academy of Sciences, Washing-
ton, D.C., 1975;.
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technology also are not a major concern of public and private users. Again.,
however, a number of policy questions, such as the level of investment in RED,
the directions and trends of the RPD, anJt the priorities assigned axe of interest
to both public and private users.
Policy and operational services are areas of major concern, particularly
in the transitional and operational phases,:where substantial. involvement of nun-.
federal users is necessary. Operational questions about data systems such as
the nature of the data,. their character, precision, and density, the frequency
and area of coverage, the response rate from demand to delivery, and the ease
and.cost of access are all important. Also of interest..to the public sector user.
is the degree to which accessiblity to data and services is based on cost or
ability-to-pay or is based on capability -to-use, rather than on some priority of
public benefits.
Substantial user.involvement. is required to assure that user needs govern
or, at least, are effective ih defining collection, distribution, and analysis
systems so that users have the opportunity and the capability to utilize the
data. The same is.true for communications and other space--derived services.
The nature and form of such involvement are major institutional: problems 'requir-
ing innovation.
Users desire substantive Tales in the making of policy decision. The
principal functions listed. in the preceding section of this report are of sub-
stantial interest to non-federal users and must be responsive to their.require-
ments. Some user groups have federal counterparts which represent .heir inter-
ests to some degree, but it is clear that user
.
 
groups Often do not see their
federal counterparts as speaking adequately for their interests..
Because non-federal public agencies may not have the same capability as. the
private sector to develop an integrated picture of needs and requirements nor
the well developed political mechanisms that the private sector has to represent
their needs and influence-executive policy, the nee;+d may be more acute for direct
participation by non-federal public agencies in thl;: policy making. At the same
time, however, problems develop in providing for direct participation because
it is difficult to determine who speaks for agencies within the states, counties,
or cities.. In spite of.these difficulties, institutional mechanisms must be.
worked out to assure the representation of state and local users in the policy
malting process.
Institutional Problems and Barriers
Many. problems and barriers to the effective application of spacer;technology
by non-federal users have,beeen touched on. earli.ei-. in. this report. 	 is useful
to discuss briefly specific ones that are prominent in the literature and have
t	 been ]Wrought out by user panels in the present study.
Many problems arise because of the breadth of possible applications. Infor-
mation or servicesrovided bp	 y space systcuis can-be applied to a -vide range of
}	 substantive domestic problems as in environmental management, earth resources
management,' land use planning, public works, transportation, health care'
delivery,, education, housing, etc., and hence serve a great diversity and multi-
pliciby of` useers: The diversity of users: Who currently. apply data or services
from many, sources entails discovery of unique and :localized application needs.
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However, economies of scale argue for developing standardized programs to serve
multiple uses. This puts a significant requirement for adaptation on the user.
Many problems stem from the nature of the user community within the non-
federal public sector. First, it is fragmented both in levels of jurisdiction
(that is, cities, counties, substate regions, and states) and within multiple
jurisdictions at the same level. Even within a single jurisdiction, many
agencies may be involved in a prob lem in a given area, with little or no
coordination. Moreover, there are fewprovisions for systematic transfer or
dissemination of information between or within various levels of government.
This user fragmentation not only inhibits the development of an aggregated set
of needs upon which to base a realistic and useful applications program, but
also creates a major marketing problem for programs which might be responsive.
Second, many state and local agencies have insufficient awareness of technologi-.
cal opportunities and inadequate capability to assess the opportunities and to
adapt them to their own needs. Third, potential users generally lace the abil-
ity to articulate needs in language that is meaningful to developers of technol-
ogy, that is,. in terms that assist suppliers . in providing solutions to user
problems. Finally, among users there is a lack of management experience R
specifying goals and policy objectives, in planning programs and budgets to
achieve objectives, and in monitoring and assessing functions for program modifi-
cation and improvement.
Similarly, problems arise on the supplier side. There is a lack of aware-
ness among technologists about state and local decision making processes and
abut the institutional, financial, and political constraints within the systems.
Many programs for technology application provide incremental improvements to
ongoing functions and the supplier does not have an appreciation for financial,
political, or organizational costs of change.
While these deficiencies have significant impact on the RFD phase, they are
particularly important in the transitional . phase. The decision to go to an
operational phase depends on demand and the ability to demonstrate as extensive
potential market. Yet, while the need may be recognized, the demand may not be
articulated. The awareness, capability, and hence demand of many potential users
lag behind available technology, and very few mechanisms exist for the aggrega-
tion and expression of user demands.
Recommendations
It as clear that serious institutional problems relative'te non-federal
users hinder the effectiveness of practical uses of space systems. The panel
has recommended the creation of a National Council for Space Applications.
Certain aspects of that recommendation are germane to the question of non-
federal user involvement,
The principle of formal membership for non-federal public user agencies on
this recommended National Council addresses a major institutional concern of
such users namely, substantial role in policyy, .	 p	  direction and priority setting
at every stage of the applications program. In addition, the assignment to the
Council of responsibility for assuring formal contact between users and
suppliers, for assurip; afigregation and representation of users, and for i.niti
g xpatin a erimental institutional development programs cleals . directly with the
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problem of assuring involvement of non-federal users. The following recommenda-
tions expand upon these points, particularly in the interim pexiod before the
Council begins to function:
1, .Tn order to capitalize on the benefits made possible by federal
investments in space LQchnology R&D and to increase the produe-
tivity, level, and qua^zz4,, of se: ice provided by state and local
governments, increased scope and level of utilisation of space
derived. information and services by state and local governments
should be a specific objective. Therefore, systematic development
within the non-federal public sector of a capabilitry to use
specific applications should be a major part of the applications
program and an explicit responsibility of the proposed National
Council for Space Applications.
in furtherance of the preceding recommendation, experimentation
with institutional arrangements that, in cooperation with users,
increase the utilization of space technoZogy in the non-federaZ'
public sector, should be an integral part of space applications
programs. Such an experimental program should include pilot
projects using field testing techniques that:
a. Are not regarded as precedent setting before the fact,
b. Do not impZy advocacy of a particular institutional approach,
e. Do not imply continuing federal support, and
d. Provide for independent evaluation.
The expected outcome of such pilot projects would not be standardized
institutional models but rather a better understanding of and experience with
various institutional arrangements in different geographical:, political, socio-
economic, and cultural contexts. Experiments should focus on stimulating the
acquisition and use of data from ,space systems through specific attention to:
1. User mechanisms to define and assess uses: requirements. Emphasis
should be placed on a diversity of mechanisms and on.encouraging
incorporation of technical talent from universities, nonprofit
research organizations, and the private sector to assist and to
:increase user capability.
2. Capability-building programs to educate user groups on the nature
and potential uses of data and services and on the kinds of soft
Ware systems to utilize them, to provide skill training, to
encourage the development of user:management capability, and. to
provide assistance for adaptation of multiple user packages to
specific local needs.
3. User systems for aggxegatinand communicating standardized:
requirements by jurisdictional levels, geographical regions, and
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Ifunctional areas of use such as earth V.-Sources, environmental
quality, etc.
Planning of -recommended experiments should take into consideration the results
of assessment of previous and current institutional arrangements for technology
application, other NASA-efforts . at fostering non-federal involvement, and current
experimental efforts being conducted by the Neticmal Science Foundation, the
National Bureau of Standards, and the technolor;^ transfer activities of other
federal agencies. Potential institutional arrangements for experimentation
should be designed and proposed by users.
3. The Panel has recommended that responsibility for this program be
assigned to the proposed National Council for Space Applications.
However, because the Panel considers that this recommendation is of
great importance, it believes that implementation should not Wait
for the establishment of the proposed National, Council. According-
Zy, the PaneZ strongly recommends that a program of ,experimentation
be initiated immediatelyby NASA with the cooperation and involve-
ment of relevant federal user agencies. Detailed planning for
experimentation and other early implementation should begin as soon
as possible, pre ferab Zy this year.
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lINTERNATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS
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As foreign countries continue to develop interests in space, it must be
expected that they will have increasing impact on the U.S. space program and
upon space applications in. particular. Practical-applications of space systems
have demonstrated an array of benefits which most sovereign nations will want to
provide for their citizenry. It is natural for them to want to participate for
maximum benefit with minimum investment. The U.S. policy of free dissemination
of technology has encouraged foreign participation. It is reasonable to expect
that this policy has led and will continue to lead to decreased international
tensions and can and will assist the U.S. in its international relations.
Early in the space age, foreign countries provided sites for communications
satellite ground stations and followed with varying degrees of understanding
the accomplishments of the U.S. space program. In later phases scientists of
other nations have furnished experiments to be carried on board U.S.. satellites.
The European community has successfully launched scientific satellites. Ground
stations for receiving satellite weather data have proliferated until now there
are more than 1,000 stations in the world for receiving weather pictures trans- 	 J
mitred automatically by U.S. satellites, An international telecommunication
satellite consortium (Intelsat) has been formed and more than 89 countries are
now members. Intelsat currently has 6 satellites operating which can provide
more than 29,000 channels for voice communication or 72 channels for television 	 3
relay.
Today, a European space agency is building the Spacelab and various coun-
tries axe building or contracting for domestic communication satellites, broad-
cast satellites, and weather satellites. Navigation and control of internation-
al aircraft via satellites will soon be initiated. Brazil, Canada and .Italy have
installed ground stations to receive earth resources data from LANDSAT, and at
Least five other countries are planning to install such stations. These coun-
tries are aware that the LANDSAT series of spacecraft is experimental and that
the U.S. has not made a commitment to provide continuity in the flow of data.
NASA and user agencies have, however, been seeking approval of programs intended
to provide continuity of data.
Increasing participation of foreign countries in space increases their 	 E
ability to exploit its potential. Recent licensing agreements have given Japan
the technological capability to develop a low-cost space transportation system.
The time when foreign countries have the capabilities to ' ego it alone" is fast
approaching.. Obviously, economic factors will have.a major . effect. on the ability
of any country to develop an independent capability.
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These factors contribute to a new series of challenges and constraints for
the U.S. space applications program as follows:
1. Continuity of data flow is needed. An increasing number of foreign
ground stations provides impetus for the continuation of earth resource surveys
by satellites. However, foreign investment in ground stations and data process-
ing facilities tends to constrain the ability to increase capability, or to
	
significantly change the characteristics of the space systems. Implied commit- 	 s
ments to foreign states are a major international consideration . and must be
considered in planning of space systems, whether current or future.
2. Data security may become increasingly pertinent. Current U.S. policy
provides for open dissemination of all data.acquired by NASA satellites. Dis-
semination takes place within a relatively short time after data acquisition.
Countries with ground stations have agreed to open dissemination of data for
the present. Currently, however, NASA satellites are experimental satellites.
As technologies advance, as abilities to extract key resource information from
data advance, and as ive move toward operational systems, it must be expected
that questions of data security will arise. If the United States is not to be
deprived of the benefits which operational systems can bring, it should take
the lead in .developing policies relative to..data dissemination,. data processing
and information extraction,
3. The technological leadership of the U.S. in space communications is
being challenged today. Concurrently, the fact that communication satellites
have entered into the operational phase for the conventional services provided
by commercial communications carriers has led the Executive Branch to a decision
to drastically curtail federal R&D on communication satellites. Meanwhile,
foreign countries are increasing their investments in space communications.R&D
and may leapfrog U.S. achievements. Government sponsored RFD is required to
assure U.S leadership in the emerging field of space materials processing and
manufacturing. U.S. leadership in the area of earth resources may be similarly
threatened unless RFD.. is pursued vigorously. Combined government-industry
teams in foreign countries axe pursuing development of space data processing
technology.
40 Cooperative as well as competitive programs. for applications of space
systems are beginning to emerge. Meteorology is an example in which close
cooperation has occurred in exploiting space technology. International programs
such as the Global Atmospheric Research. Program (CARP) are closely interrelated
with the U.S. meteorological program. The Japanese are building a synchronous
orbit meteorological satellite to work in conjunction with the U.S. Synchronous
Meteorological- Satellite (SMS) . Communisations is an area of cooperation ready
for.international competition. Earth resources :and space processing are pro-.
grams that are nearing the possibility for either international cooperation or
competition.
f
:
j	 ...Foreign countries and international organizations such as the U.S.: and the
World Bank have the same problems as the U.S. in aggregating: user needs, con-
solidating requirements, and establishing focal points for program participation.
The recommended National Council for Space Applications, with strong assistance
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SPECIALJSSUES WHICH RELATE TO PRICING POLICY
The attention of the Panel has been drawn to a number of special issues
related to pricing policy. which while they clearly impact the deliberations of
other Panels require particular consideration in the context of institutional
arrangements. These include selected examples, existing legislation, and experi-
ences-and provide a background for consi.deration.of.prici.ng  policy.
USE OF GOVERNMENT FACILITIES
Existing legislation and implementing Executive Orders provide that certain
specialized government facilities (such as NASA wind tunnels) can be made avail-
able for use by public and private groups A determination must usually be made
that the propo.s ed. work is in. the .public interest, that it. does not :interfere
with the primary mission of the facility., that it does not unfairly compete with
comparable private facilities, and that reimbursement is made for incremental
costs of facility operation and technical. support. An interesting question is
whether experimental results so obtained must be.made public.. At least in the
case of NASA wind tunnels, companies paying for the use of the fa-lities'have.
proprietary rights to the data.
CENSUS DATA EXAMPLE
Data derived from a U.S. census can be released to users in a special, form,
provided that data are sufficientlyaggregated  that indi.vi dual . reporting `units.
cannot be identified. The U.S. Census Bureau will undertake, on a non-
interference basis, special studies or tabulations provided that the request is
deemed to be in the public interest and ,on . condition that the information so
derived is made publicly available. Reimbursement for the incremental. cost is
required from both public and private users and usually is.stipulated.in  a
specific contractual agreement-
PATENT LICENSING
Patent licensing; policy fort U S, government as a whole is; under . review
because of recent litigation. Currently, NM;A patent licensing policy provides
_	
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that NASA products may be licensed either 'exclusively or nonexclusively. Equal
opportunity to apply for licensing is provided, and the applicant must specify
a royalty fee (which may be zero) that he is willing to pay. This fee is sub-jeel: ^o negotiation as are ocher terms of the license. Exclusive licensing
requires a determination that the proposed use is in the public interest and
that protection through exclusivity is needed to Commercialize the technology.
NASA has made it clear that the size of the proposed royalty fee will not be the
sole basis,.for awarding licenses. Monies derived from royalty payments flow to
the U.S. Treasury and are not retained by NASA.
SPACE'. PROCESSING
Cost sharing agreements, both international and domestic, are common. An
experiment to grow crystals of relatively insoluable substances, to be conducted
as a part of the Apollo--Soyuz Test Project (ASTP.) , is . apparently: the first case
of industrial cost sharing that has occurred in the program of experiments on
processing of materials in space. Development costs are being shared equally by
NASA and Rockwell. International Corporation.
OVERALL POLICY
Pricing for several kinds of stanilarcl products has been developed within
the federal government. Reports from.the F.S. Government Printing Office or
the National Technical Information Serv ice are priced according to a general
principle of.generating.enou h revenues to offset the publishing and operating 	 g	 P	 g	 p	 g
costs. Cirrently prices for earth observation images and. data from the
Department of the Interior, Earth Resources Observation Program Data Center at
Sioux Falls, South Dakota, and from other federal data centers are based on
}	 recovery,of costs at those centers.. The objective is that the dissemination
centers will eventually become self-supporting.
The Panel feels that pricing for space systems data and services should.
be
 based solely on the objective of revenue generation, but should include con-
sideration of other effects of price on demand and user involvement as discussed
below. There are areas in which prices should not only offset incremental costs
but also help to recoup the costs of RFD. There are other areas i n which prices
designed to generate profits will shut off long term revenue flow and prevent
realization of the largest possible benefits by reducing incentives.to.users.
and limiting the number of consumers who.can enter the system. The Panel rec-
ommends that pricing be decided according, to policies established by the pro
posed National Council for Space Applications, and should take into account the
following factors:.
1. The phase of system development In general, prices should include
more of the costs as the system proceeds from RFD to operational
status.i
2. Public benefit to be derived from the product or service.
^r
_
3. Marginal value of having a large body of users assessed in terms of
a. Efficiency of large scale systems C:Eor example, number
and scale of launches, integrity of national or global
data systems) , including economies of scale in manufac-
ture and operation;
b. Sensitivity to price of non-federal investments in per-
fecting technology and supporting systems; and,
co The effects of providing a large number of centers for
dissemination of space derived data, 'particularly in the
transitionalphase between RED and operational.
4. Effects of alternative price levels, on market structure and equity.
5. Effect.on international commerce.
6. effect on U.S. capacity to maintain sufficient technological
capability to
i
a. Continue the U.S. role as a leader in development.of 	 ?
peaceful. use of space, and
b. Assure continuity of: service necessary. for users to
decide that they can safely make long term commitments
and investments.
ff cts of	 components and su ortin7. Ripple e	 prices. on economics of coe
	p1?	 PP	 g
systems which may be needed for military or other federal programs,
in other words, effects on totaZ revenue and expenditures of the	 {
U.S. government
The Panel recognizes that the cost of space derived information or services
will involve a wide range of _prices, rates for one-time.and continuing services,
and a variety of cost sharing arrangements. However, the Panel believes that
consideration for each situation of :the. factors just listed will. produce a
pricing system which is sensitive to most of the elasticities and ancillary
effects which should be taken into account. In no case, in the Panel's view,
should pricing policy be governed solely by short-term first-order effects on
the revenue of the agency involved or of the, IT,S..government as a:.whole
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SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The capabilities of space systems constitute a totally ne.w.technological
force developed within the United States beginning in 1958. In the decade and
a half since the start of the space program, rapid progress has been made in
the application of space technology. Operational uses of weather and communica-
tions satellites already have important worldwide influence. The Panel on
Institutional. Arrangements believes that the full extent to which this still-
new technology can serve mankind is not yet recognized. Indeed, the Panel feels
that only the surf=ace has been scratched in applying space systems to earthly
problems that are recognized as currently or imminently critical:. The Panel,
therefore, recommends that deliberate and planned programs together with the
necessary institutional arrangements be established to assure the widest pos-
sible application of what has been and is stiZZ being learned and what is and
can be done with technology .already availab Ze.
The Panel's recommendations are aimed primarily at providing means for
involving potential users (within federal, state, and local governmental
agencies and private sectors) in the early stages of planning and implementa-
tion of space programs, and continuing their involvement throughout three suc-
cessive phases in the evolution of space systems, defined as follows:
l.. RED phase, characterized principally by the need to develop,
test,. and evaluate technological capability with some advisory
involvement of potential users.
2. Transitional. phase, characterized by a demonstrated technolog-
ical capability but still without a fully developed and;.gener-
ally, with an unproven user market. It is necessary to bring
the technologists and potential users together. Needs of poten-
tial users 'are tested and evaluated directly through institutional
arrangements that can be effectively used for the third phase.
3. Operational phase, characterized by available technology and
defined user market. Weather and communications are obvious
examples of areas in which space systems are operational although
parts of these applications are still in the transitional phase.
43
PRECEDING PAGH
	 UOW i
i
i
The Panel has examined the requirements of these three phases of space
systems evolution to assure that its recommended institutional arrangements are
suitable to each.	 The principal resulting recommendations are as follows:
1. NASA should continue to furnish the capability for technical
support services through the operational phase, with particular
emphasis on launching and tracking, data acquisition, and
general advisory space system support.
2. Open access to data for all users must be assured through a
federal data management system but any user who has the incen-
tive to do so should be permitted to establish his own data
gathering and processing system at his own expense.	 We there-
fore propose the possibility of a variety of data processing
centers, with at least one faiZ-safe Zink that assures to all
users an opportunity for equal access.
3. A continuing R&D process must be assured through aZZ phases of
space systems activities.	 NASA obviously has that responsibility
in the R&D phase.	 Lack of a well-defined market makes necessary
a strong and continuing federal role in supporting (funding) R&D
during the transitional phase.
	 At the same time formalized user	 i
guidance should define R&D needs and evaluate results through
that phase.	 Thus, joint funding with non-federal users should be
encouraged.
	 NASA should continue to serve as the agency respon-
sible for operation and funding but should .receivemulti-agency
support and participation.	 During the operational phase, users
should fund R&D that is specifically intended for their systems
while broader national needs, defined by users, will be satisfied
by NASA with federal funds when private investments are not
adequate.	 A systematic, means should be devised for user payback
of federaZ funds spent for R&D in this phase.
4. Although the Panel is concerned about the weaknesses of committees
as operating organizations, it nevertheless stronglry recommends
the establishment of a National Council for Space Applications.
Potential users of space applications exist.within federal, state,
and local governln mtaZ agencies and within the private sector and
their needs exteW through a wide variety of disciplines.
	 The
proposed Councilshould have tap-Zevet representation from
involved federal Executive Departments and agencies and should pro-
vide for state and local governmental representation in its delib-
erations.	 Such a Council is needed to assure systematic policies
and arrangemenvs . for coordinating user needs with the techno7og-
icaZ capabi lity that has been and is'being deveZoped.	 An existing
mu7,tiplieity of agreements and committees emphasizes the need for
such a coordinating framework, particularly as users and the
desirability of user aggregation increase.
	
The.proposed Council
would exercise the following functions:	 -^
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General policy direction
Priority setting
Maintenance of open access to data
Assurance of continuity and stm2ardization
Coordination and evaluation of program development and
implementation
Establishment of pricing policy and provision for impact
assessment
Assurance of formal contact between users and suppliers
Encouragement of non-federaZ government involvement and
investment.
The Panel believes that the proposed National Council will have suffi-
cient pcwer . to perform effectively these eight major functions only if
the foZZowing requirements are met:
The Council is statutoriZy established.
2. Its membership includes all federal agencies with a sub-
stantiaZ interest in space applications and a system is
developed by the Council for state and local goverrmtentaZ
agencies subsequently to become members.
3. The Chairman is the Administrator of NASA.
4. An independent professional staff is provided to the
iCouncil.
5. The Council administers its own budget that should pro-
vide for,.conong other activities, experimental programs
conducted through appropriate operating agencies by which
institutional arrangements are developed by users.
6. The Council is responsible for assuri7V aggregation and
and representation of users of spaco-rsystems applications.- 	 c
7. The Council is required to report at least annually, and
otherwise as requested, to the U.S. Congress.
B. Substructures in disciplines requiring specialized appZi-
cations .ire. developed and delegated certain functional
responsibilities.by the Council...
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j	 The PaneZ emphasizes that Council recommendations wiZZ be carried out
by existing agencies and that the CounciZ wiZl not repZace the exist-
ing budgetary process, operationaZ responsibilities, or regulatory
functions.
5. The PaneZ recommends the formal establishment of an experimentaZ
program for institutionaZ deveZopment and evaZuation to deter-
mine the most effective means by which non-federal potentiaZ
users can be organized and encouraged to make effective use of
space systems. This program should be initiated immediateZy by
NASA but shouZd be assigned to the National CounciZ as soon as
the.CounciZ is operable.
In conclusion, the Panel on Institutional Arrangement believes space appli-
cations carried out in a mature way with reasonable constraints to assure a
soundly paced program should provide major long term benefits to all mankind.
Technology is clearly at the point where expanded and extensive uses can be made
and should be encouraged. Implementation of the recommendations of this Panel
and of other panels in the 1974 study require enlarged legislative authority.
We believe that policies and authorities defined in the National Aeronautics and
Space Act of 1958 should be extended to assure the,means and to emphasize the
importance of applying the space systems capability that has been and is being
successfully developed.
